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THE PRESIDENT AS INTERNATIONAL LEADER
RICHARD P. LONGAKER*
Before taking office in 1913, Woodrow Wilson remarked to a friend: "It would be
the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs."' To-
day, a President comes to office assured that he will spend most of his time and make
his most difficult decisions in the field of global politics. Wilson's hopes were shat-
tered by the First World War; Roosevelt's similar hopes by the Second; and within
the last ten years, international leadership-a function that was thought to be
temporary-has become a firm institutional addition to the American Presidency.
Any President taking office today knows that one of his major responsibilities will
be to attempt to exert leadership abroad, if not actually to lead. The emergence of
this presidential function in recent years has added to the already distended powers
of the chief executive, has changed in important respects the nature of the office, and
has complicated the already complex problems of the Presidency. That this is true is
demonstrated by the fact that the major constitutional struggles since the Second
World War-the Bricker amendment, the Steel seizure, the Great Debate over
presidential dispatch of troops to Europe, the McCarthy episode, and the intervention
in the Korean War-were provoked by presidential responses to the demands of the
new role. The purpose here is to identify the conditions under which the President
can most successfully function as an international leader, to sketch briefly the his-
torical development, to analyze the constitutional and institutional setting of his
leadership, and to discuss some of the effects his new responsibility has on his
traditional functions as a domestic leader.
The phrases used to describe the President's new role are various and frequently
misleading. Some speak of the President as world leader, or as exercising world
leadership. The existence of the Soviet Union, of course, precludes the use of this
term, if taken literally. Others depict him as "leader of a coalition of free nations" or
of a "coalition of the free,"' a tide which is closer to the truth but overlooks the
conflicting pressures of coalition leadership, the persuasion of neutrals, and the fact
that the President tries to lead those, like Tito and Franco, who are not, ideologically
speaking, free. The only term reasonably free from ambiguity is international leader,
and even this phrase requires severe qualification, for the President's offer of leader-
ship is often rejected. But still, the phrase implies at least an attempt by the
President to work in concert with other nations in order to defend the national
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interest. It implies, moreover, that he becomes, on occasion, a vital influence in the
policy making of other governments. The President can no longer stay at home;
instead, he must journey beyond the boundaries of the United States in an effort
to tip the balance of world power in favor of the United States. To assert that the
President can no longer be passive director of American foreign relations is only
to raise the question of how and when his leadership should be exercised. It is
also to ask whether or not the President can, as the leader of a democratic nation
in a constantly shifting international setting, exert leadership in a sustained fashion.
One President has stated that the essence of presidential leadership is to "per-
suade [people] to do what they ought to do without persuasion."3 In the interna-
tional field, the essence of leadership is to persuade other leaders that the self-interest
of all dictates a common course of action. Persuasion is facilitated if the group is
held together by common beliefs and common dangers and if the President can artic-
ulate, forcibly and clearly, mutual hopes and fears. Presidential leadership abroad,
in other words, depends on the world situation, his own ability, and the political
and economic circumstances in the United States. As contemporary restlessness
in Europe indicates, both in Western Europe's renewed interest in a European union
and the Anglo-French attack on Egypt, the President is inevitably involved in
foreign affairs and must attempt to lead, but he is not inevitably an international
leader. Like presidential leadership in Congress, presidential international leadership
is potential and conditional. Too frequently it is suggested that the need inevitably
produces the result.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP
What then produces the potential and what factors must be present to transform
the potential into effective leadership? Obviously, the major factor in the Presi-
dent's potential for leadership is the enormous strength of the United States, the
productive skill of her people, her size, resources, and population. But other con-
ditions are almost as essential.
Among the most important is the existence of a common threat and fear of the
consequences of acting alone or-and this is much less cohesive-the existence of a
common, positive policy that is based not on an external threat, but on common
ideals and purposes. Fear of Soviet domination has led to the provisional acceptance
of American leadership in the past and, as fear has dwindled, American leadership
has dwindled with it. Another condition, closely related to the first, is that basic
agreement on goals and strategy must be possible. Under present conditions, the
common goal, to prevent the extension of Soviet influence, is provided, but there
must also be the possibility of agreement on methods. Once again, when the possi-
bility does not exist-as in the recent Anglo-French and American differences over
policy in the Middle East, or British-American differences over Formosan policy-
the conditions for effective leadership are undermined. The same may be said for
3 RossiTER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 122.
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the political situation within the United States. If the President is to lead abroad,
there must be common agreement among the important sectors of American society
on the goals of his leadership and the methods to be used; in turn, his capacity for
leadership is increased if there is a clear and tangible foreign threat to the nation's
security. American leadership after 1945 was possible only because of the Vandenberg
point of view; conversely, if there is any justification for Franklin D. Roosevelt's
wavering before 1940, it is his awareness of the deep division within the United States
over the question of American involvement abroad. Leadership, to be effective, re-
quires the possibility of reaching fundamental agreement among those to be led.
Ideally, international leadership also assumes the balanced use, under unified
presidential direction, of industrial resources and skills, sound administrative tech-
niques, military power, and an idea. In our recent history, the Marshall Plan and
NATO illustrate the balanced application of the four essentials. Industrial resources
and skill produce international reliance, if not dependence, upon the nation possess-
ing them and upon the President who directs their export. Although there are
exceptions, it is generally true that the curve of presidential leadership is tied to the
curve of American economic and military assistance. It is possible, in other words,
to purchase the right to lead, although the purchase is seldom directly over the
counter. But economic persuasion must be supplemented by proper administrative
techniques at home and abroad to allow for sound planning and unobtrusive execu-
tion of the President's leadership. Conflicting policy statements, such as the contrary
views of President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State concerning the moral
posture of "neutrals," can upset in a day prestige constructed over a period of months.
The willingness to use military force--or at least the determination not to re-
nounce outright the use of force-is an essential condition of leadership. It is
arguable that the excessively peaceful atmosphere at the "summit meetings" in
Geneva and American guarantees that force would not be used during the recent
Suez crisis were instrumental in cutting into the substance of presidential leadership.
On the other hand, unwarranted truculence and overemphasis on military means
can be as damaging as a faint military heart. The Berlin airlift and the use of the
Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits are the best recent examples of the judicious use
of military and industrial potential while avoiding, at the same time, the excesses of
a shooting war. In order to maintain leadership, the President must follow the
dictum of Theodore Roosevelt concerning soft speaking and the big stick, which,
despite constant repetition, cannot be improved upon. Unobtrusively, but none the
less clearly, the President must base his leadership on a firm military foundation.
This raises the question of the adequacy of nuclear strategy as a support for presi-
dential leadership. Does overdependence on the nuclear counterblow reduce the
flexibility of the President's international leadership? The President's leadership,
if it is to be sustained and effective, must be based on a tactical air arm and
mobile naval force, as well as powerful ground forces. If the President bases his
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leadership solidly on the ultimate weapon, he is likely to be frozen in a position of
inaction as lesser wars swirl about him and lose initiative to allies who expect small
fires to be quenched by carefully controlled methods, not a deluge. The police action
and the use of "volunteers," not nuclear war, have become the standard for military
involvement in recent years and if the President is to maintain initiative, there
cannot be sole reliance on nuclear strategy. As the American intervention in
Korea, among other crises, proves, the path of leadership follows a swath cut by
infantrymen as well as the threat of ultimate nuclear war. The President has the
unenviable task of finding a balance between the two.
Military might, industrial strength, and administrative techniques must be tied
to an idea, both to activate those who are implementing policy and to assist in the
persuasion of those who are willing to follow presidential leadership. Wilson's Four-
teen Points, the Four Freedoms, the defensive Atlantic alliance, Point Four, and
Atoms for Peace are all ideas which aroused attention and hope, have helped to
persuade, and have symbolized presidential initiative and firm intentions. The idea
must be transcendent and mix national interest and humanitarianism in an attractive
blend. It must possess the elasticity which admits Titoists, Falangists, and Syngman
Rhee and yet avoid the imputation of opportunism. The proposal to admit Eastern
European nations into the Marshall Plan-so quickly rejected by the Soviet Union
-allowed this program to meet this difficult test.
Successful presidential leadership, besides requiring harmony of military, ad-
ministrative, industrial, and ideological effort, requires the adroit use of propaganda
weapons to articulate the presidential effort. His leadership can fail if the goals
are not made known or if they are not understood, enlivened, and protected against
counterattack. The long struggle to reactivate the propaganda services, which were
temporarily abandoned in 1945, reached a turning point in the first month of the
Eisenhower administration with the establishment of the United States Informa-
tion Service and the appointment of a special assistant to the President on propa-
ganda matters3 Unfortunately for presidential efficiency in this field, the chief
executive of a democratic state can never be the single voice heard overseas. Much
of the propaganda effort cannot be positive presentation of principles and presidential
programs, but must be directed toward counteracting the exploitable weaknesses-as
in the field of civil rights or outbursts of McCarthyism-in the United States. Even
though a democratic society compounds the difficulties, this does not obviate the
necessity for the effective use of propaganda techniques as an active support for
international leadership.
Finally, in the domestic sphere, sound international leadership by the President
presupposes a substantial degree of institutional harmony between the President
and both parties in Congress as well as presidential willingness to sacrifice short-
term political advantage in the interests of consistent leadership abroad. Many
' Sargeant, Information and Cultural Representation Overseas, in THE REPRESENTA1TON OF THE
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instances can be cited of a breakdown in congressional-executive relations which
have temporarily disabled the President's leadership overseas-the League fight in
the Senate in i919, the isolationist power in Congress in 1940-41, the Taft-Wherry re-
sistance to the dispatch of American troops in support of NATO, the right wing
Republican attack on American foreign policy in the Far East, and, more recently,
the strong congressional protests against foreign aid appropriations. Congressional
criticism of the President, when not blatantly partisan, is helpful, and fortunately
there are many examples of cooperation, particularly under the guidance of Senators
Vandenberg and George. In Congress, the President must satisfy the demands
of what one commentator calls "extra-partisanship," the ambidextrous posture of
using his party but not as a partisan, working "outside party lines while maintaining
a base of support in [his] party."' Effective leadership abroad must first meet the
test of effective leadership within the United States, in the parties, in Congress, and
among the public at large.
What has been said about the necessary conditions for effective international
leadership by the President is, of course, the counsel of perfection. Because the
conditions are affected by the global balance or imbalance, by the necessities of
popular government, including the separation of powers, and by the intangible
quality of many of the problems to be solved, it is patently impossible for a Presi-
dent to meet all of the requirements fully. But since he is constitutionally responsible
for defending the national interest, he is, nevertheless, obliged to make the attempt.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE AS INTERNATIONAL LEADER
Every President since Washington has been committed to the defense of America's
national interest, although from Washington's time until recent years, Presidents
performed their duty by withdrawing from permanent international involvement
and active intervention as international leaders. The policies in Latin America
during the first one hundred and thirty years of United States history provided a
severely limited dress rehearsal for later international leadership by the President.
From the Monroe Doctrine through the Venezuela crisis and the Roosevelt corollary
to the seizing of Panama, there was no lack of recognition of American interest to
the south, even though the methods fell far short of the modern tests of constructive
leadership. The subsequent Good Neighbor policy and the cooperative efforts
culminating in the Rio Pact in 1947, mark the emergence of American leadership
based on factors other than force and dollar diplomacy. In the Spanish-American
War, the United States came of age as an international military power if only,
among the many tangled motives, to continue a pattern of American hegemony in the
Western Hemisphere. If there is similarity between the Presidents' experience in
Latin America and the broad international commitments of today, it lies in the fact
that American policy in most instances-the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt corollary,
Caribbean intervention, and even the more recent Guatemala intervention-was a
' BRADFORD WESTERFIELD, FOREIGN POLICY AND PARTY POLITICS 16 (1955).
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reaction against outside pressure and not a product of positive presidential initiative.
The Presidents' involvement in the Western Hemisphere differed from today's
international leadership not only in the restricted geographical commitment, but in
the methods and spirit underlying that leadership. The policies, except for the
Spanish-American War, were basically unilateral executive actions with limited
congressional participation, the part played by the Government was largely diplomatic
and military, not economic, and the settlements were imposed unilaterally by the
United States from a position of uncompromising strength.
Not until after the Second World War did the President assume the full obliga-
tion of international leadership in situations where the force or the threat of force is
inadequate in itself, where Congress is a continually active partner, and where there
is a complete industrial commitment and association with permanent alliances. The
first President, in other words, to accept international leadership as a full-time job
was President Truman, although his predecessors haltingly prepared the way. The
only President to have positive enthusiasm for the role was Theodore Roosevelt; all
others were drawn into leadership initially because of the failure of leadership else-
where and in reaction to external pressure. Only Theodore Roosevelt attempted
international leadership, in the first instance, because of his own sense of enter-
prise.
Most Presidents, seemingly, have been reluctant to try to lead abroad because
they have realized from the beginning-as Wilson did too late-the limitations which
the constitutional system and America's fundamental noninterventionism would
impose on their leadership. And many have shared with their compatriots an
aversion to "foreign" entanglements. Wilson moved hesitatingly, and only after
agonizing reflection, to shatter the stalemate of the First World War and to secure
the balance of power in the moral world he envisioned.' FDR was less hesitant
but reaped Wilson's whirlwind and struggled against this before participating in the
destruction of governments whose hostility to the United States had long been
known. And Harry Truman moved to check anti-Communist forces in Greece
and Turkey and Europe only in the face of British withdrawal and near chaos in
Europe. American leadership, since Theodore Roosevelt, has been, in short, the
leadership of counterattack. The first Roosevelt understood the demands of leader-
ship as well as any President but although he had the script-except for Algeciras
and Portsmouth-he did not have the world stage. There was no need for the
President to direct the forces of stability when the world was already stable.
The history of presidential leadership from Wilson to Truman can be described-
to borrow a phrase from an authority on diplomacy-as a shift in emphasis from
the search for justice to the search for security.7 Woodrow Wilson, the first Presi-
dent to become actively engaged on the entire world stage, did not fully appreciate
' See I CHARLES SEYMOUR, TiE INTnA'E PAPERS OF COLONEL HOUSE 296-98 (1926); and 2 id. at
at 228.
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either. The principal characteristic of Wilson's leadership abroad was its excessively
sanguine and moral quality. He recognized as early as igoo that the "plunge into
international politics" in the war with Spain had "greatly increased [the President's]
power and opportunity for constructive statesmanship... .," Until i9i7, however, he
was extremely reluctant to intervene outside the Western Hemisphere, although
his later attitude was foreshadowed by his moral crusade in Mexico. He assumed a
commanding role in the First World War only at the last moment, but with the
Fourteen Points, the negotiations in Paris, and during the League fight, he accepted
the presidential obligation of international leadership with a vengeance. His failure
or the failure of his less optimistic compatriots brought about a reaction against presi-
dential involvement abroad which only Pearl Harbor and the fear of Soviet absorp-
tion of Europe after 1945 could dispel.
It is significant that American efforts in leadership in the interwar period are
associated with the names of Secretaries of State: Hughes with the Washington
Conference, Stimson with Manchuria, Hull with the London Economic Conference
and the more successful Reciprocal Trade Program. Presidents did not seem to
sense the obligation, and if they did, public opinion and not the President, set the
tone. One need only cite FDR's attitude toward the London Economic Confer-
ence, his failure to offset the Nye investigations by a public statement warning of
the fatal weakness of its conclusions,' or his support of the Neutrality Act in the
campaign of 1940' to realize both public and presidential abdication of inter-
national responsibility. Only the timid foray of the "quarantine" speech, the quiet
preparation for war by the joint Anglo-American staff after January 1941, and the
Curtiss-Wright decision stand out as reminders that the President possessed the
potential to lead.
The Lend-Lease Act, combining as it did the essentials of industrial power,
administrative techniques, cautious military support, and an idea, marks the break-
through. The President's international leadership under Roosevelt was character-
ized by its personal quality, as Churchill's leadership was. There is little doubt
that FDR was the dominant leader-if only by Churchill's conscious submission
to the fact of American industrial and military superiority. Because of Roosevelt's
administrative methods and his shortsighted evaluation of postwar conditions,
presidential leadership was not institutionalized; however, the combination of
Truman's administrative methods, the National Security Act of 1947, the Marshall
Plan, and NATO, finally brought about the institutionalization of the President's
new role. The British retreat from international leadership and the realities of a
bipolar world made clear that the President's responsibility was neither temporary
nor could it afford to be merely personal. The easy adaptability of Roosevelt's
leadership was gradually exchanged for the sometimes excessively institutionalized
W ,OODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMSENT 22 (Meridian Books, 1956).
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and security-conscious presidential leadership of today. Recent and past experience
suggests that contemporary international leadership cannot depend alone on military
security or moral leadership. Neither will it succeed if it is merely personal or
rigidly institutional. It requires the difficult mixture of sound institutional support,
of personal leadership, and the balanced application of justice and security.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BAsIs
The constitutional basis for the President's role as leader is no more than an
extension and broadening of his traditional responsibilities as chief of foreign
relations. There is no better description of this function than in Durand v. Hollins:
As the Executive head of the nation, the President is made the only legitimate organ
of the General Government, to open and carry on correspondence or negotiations with
foreign nations, in matters concerning the interests of the country or of its citizens. It is
to him, also, that citizens abroad must look for protection of person and property, and
for the faithful execution of the laws existing and intended for their protection. For this
purpose, the whole executive power of the country is placed in his hands, under the
Constitution, and the laws passed in pursuance thereof.... The great object and duty
of Government is the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the people com-
posing it, whether abroad or at home; and any Government failing in the accomplishment
of the object, or the performance of the duty, is not worth preserving.
In the first instance, the President's power to assume the responsibilities of inter-
national leader arises from his constitutional status as the executive head of the
nation. As Hamilton pointed out in the Pacificus-Helvidius exchange with Madison,
the President is not merely the instrument of Congress in foreign relations, but the
possessor of independent executive power of which the specifically mentioned sub-
sidiary powers to appoint ambassadors and to make treaties are minor manifesta-
tions 2 The notion was reaffirmed in the Hoover Commission Task Force Report
on Foreign Affairs : 3
The Constitution has left a great area of unassigned powers in which someone must act
for the United States from time to time, and in the absence of any other assignment, the
President, in his capacity as executive, is the only one able to act.
Possession of independent executive power means that the President cannot be
satisfied in following a course set by the legislature in foreign affairs, but must search
actively for the path leading to national advancement and preservation. In turn,
he is not limited to action approved by Congress, but can employ any means not
prohibited by the Constitution or the laws "to safeguard the nation."'' 4 The consti-
"' 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4186, at 112 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 186o). See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT
C. 5 (1948).
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tutional reasoning that vests positive executive power in the President and thus
bestows on him the responsibility for all positive action not prohibited by the Consti-
tution or statutes, including leadership abroad, rests on a practical foundation that
was clearly described by John Jay in Federalist 64-namely, that the President, as
distinguished from Congress, can bring to bear on foreign affairs secrecy, dispatch,
and unity. The unity of the executive-the single voice and hand of leadership-
the necessity for secrecy, a center of information and coordination of policy, and
dispatch in implementing policy and protecting the nation in times of crisis have
all received the sanction of custom. This has been demonstrated in recognition
policy, in the right of the President to withhold documents from Congress, in statutes
(generous delegations of power by Congress in foreign affairs), and in judicial de-
cisions (from Martin v. Mote' to United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp ')
over the years.
The broad interpretation of the opening words of Article II vesting the executive
power in the President, buttressed by the practical arguments for presidential
direction of foreign affairs, does not provide the only constitutional permission for
presidential involvement in leadership abroad. He is also supported by the specific
grants of power to see to the faithful execution of the laws and his function as
commander-in-chief. The presidential obligation faithfully to execute the laws is a
formidable grant of power in an era of extensive treaty-making; whether action is
taken under Article V of the North Atlantic treaty, the United Nations treaty
and the UN Participation Act, or lesser agreements, the President is as likely to
move into a position of international leadership in executing the treaties as he was
while negotiating them. President Truman based American entry into one of the
nation's most frustrating but perhaps most fruitful wars, the "police" action in
Korea, on his obligation to accomplish the faithful execution of the laws-in this
case, the UN Charter. Because of American military and economic power, the
President, in this instance, and potentially under the NATO system, has become the
executive representative of the signatory nations in enforcing international law.
Moreover, it is a settled principle of constitutional law that the President's power
as commander-in-chief is a broad discretionary grant permitting the President to
deploy the armed forces in peacetime as well as war, for his own chosen diplomatic
or strategic purposes. The Eisenhower administration has imposed limitations on
itself in this regard by declaring that any movement of troops that might involve
the United States in war should follow a congressional resolution bestowing dis-
cretion on the President. This procedure was followed in the Formosa crisis, for
Quemoy and Matsu in the Pescadores, but it is more a product of domestic political
tactics than constitutional law. And President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State
have specifically reserved the plenary power of the President on occasions when
Congress cannot be consulted and have denied that Congress must be consulted to
is 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
10 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
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determine the disposition of forces when there is no proximity to actual conflict.'1
President Truman relied, in part, on his power as commander-in-chief-independent
of prior congressional approval-to send United States troops into Korea. The role
of the commander-in-chief in peacetime was exhaustively considered during the
Great Debate in Congress in i95i over presidential assignment of troops to Europe
without express congressional approval and was finally settled to presidential ad-
vantage. At that time, the President and his advisers contended that his power to
dispatch troops was plenary, and the extent to which the commander-in-chief clause
contributes to the President's function as leader, in peacetime, is clear in the follow-
ing statement, one of many similar declarations to appear during the Great Debate: s
In time of peace the President is just as much Commander in Chief as he is in time
of war. His power over the Armed Forces remains the same. But in time of peace the
exercise of that power is directed, not at subduing an enemy, but at broader considerations
of national policy in general. In particular, the peacetime functions of the Commander in
Chief are related to our defense needs and to the responsibilities of the President in the
field of foreign affairs.
Finally, some Presidents have contended that the constitutional foundations for
leadership abroad are supplemented, indirectly, by the President's oath of office.
As Robert Sherwood states in Roosevelt and Hopkins: "Having taken the oath of
office as President three times, he knew it by heart, and was well aware that he was
sworn not only to "uphold" but to "defend" the Constitution of the United States.
It was a matter of his own judgment-and the judgment of his advisers whom he
was empowered to appoint-as to where that defense should begin."' 9  The oath to
defend the Constitution is, in effect, the oath to defend the sovereign integrity of
the United States. It can be--if only indirectly-an additional support for presi-
dential initiative in bringing other nations together in defense of mutual global
interests.
Besides the constitutional basis for presidential leadership in foreign affairs, the
President gains authority from statutory grants of power. His authority is also
reinforced by treaties, by executive agreements, by establishing or giving the President
power to establish agencies to assist him in his foreign responsibilities, and by appro-
priations. And it was settled in the Curtiss-Wright case that statutory gifts of
discretion in foreign affairs are not to be judged by the ordinary interpretation of
delegated powers. Affirming "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
"I Statement by Secretary of State Dulles at the Nine Power Conference on Western Defense, Sept.
29, 1954, 31 DEr'T STATE BULL. 523 (1924); Message to Congress on the Formosan Situation, Jan.
24, 1955, Security of the United States of America, H. Doe. No. 76, 84th Cong., ist Sess. (1955), 32
DEp'T STATE BuLL. 211 (955); and presidential press conference, Dec. 2, 1954, N. Y. Times, Dec. 3,
1954, P. 18, cols. 2-7.
" Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on the Armed Services, Powers of the President
to Send the Armed Forces Outside the United States, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (x951).
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relations," Justice Sutherland went on to declare that it was unwise for Congress
to stipulate narrow and definite standards in delegating power to the President:20
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embar-
rassment-perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective, through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of dis-
cretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved.
THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Today, the most impressive characteristic of presidential leadership in the inter-
national field is the high degree of institutionalization. In contrast with the situation
before the First World War, when our international commitments were hardly
greater than the Pan American Union and the International Postal Union, and when
Wilson depended on Colonel House and the Department of State, the President today
is indirect or direct participant in at least five treaty organizations (ANZUS,
SEATO, NATO, the Rio Pact, UN) and numerous specialized international organ-
izations and eight domestic agencies devoted solely to assisting him in his interna-
tional duties and numberless others that assist him indirectly. The complicated
structure that stands behind the President's international leadership has increased
in size, if not in efficiency, with the growth of presidential responsibility abroad,
and nearly all agencies have come to participate actively in support of the President's
leadership. That the Department of State and the military departments have be-
come only partial contributors to the making and execution of foreign policy is as
much of a truism as the statement that all aspects of domestic affairs in the United
States have a direct or indirect effect on America's global position. In recent years,
for example, the Departments of Agriculture, State, and Treasury have been, on
occasion, intimately involved with questions influencing the President's position
overseas; Agriculture in the proper use of farm surpluses and technical aid; the
Treasury-as the active life of Secretary Humphrey indicates-in the task of finding
a balance between domestic economic health and commitments abroad; and Justice
in the production of legal opinions-such as the "destroyers for bases" contribution
of Attorney General Jackson.
Hand in hand with the deeper involvement of the traditional departments in
providing assistance to the President in his new role, efforts have been made to
adjust institutions in the more immediate presidential family to the urgent demands
for advice and the coordination of policy making and execution. Though some of
these agencies, such as the Council of Economic Advisers and the Bureau of the Bud-
get, were established by Congress to deal predominantly with domestic problems, they
have necessarily felt the weight of the President's international obligation. Others
were designed specifically to help the President shoulder this weight. The Atomic
Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
20 299 U. S. at 320.
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Office of Defense Mobilization, and the National Security Council with its helpmeet,
the Operations Coordinating Board, have appeared and developed since 1947, the year
when the President learned that leadership abroad was to be more than a temporary
responsibility. Other offices, commissions, and ad hoe individual assignments, such
as Harold Stassen's job as Secretary of Peace, or Disarmament, Clarence Randall's
Commission on Foreign Trade and his more recent appointment as Special Adviser
to the President on Foreign Economic Affairs, and the Office of the Special Assistant
to the President in National Security Affairs appear and dissolve depending on the
degree of presidential need and favor. No more compelling evidence is required
of the existence of the President's new responsibility or the personal and institutional
burden it places on him than the increase in the number of individuals reporting
to him in this field.
How these agencies are used or if they are used at all depends, in the first instance,
on international conditions and the administrative preference of the President and
his immediate staff. There is no best way to arrange institutional support for presi-
dential international leadership without considering the person in office or the prob-
lem at hand. There are principles of coordination of the international effort, the
establishment of clear lines of responsibility and action, and the requirement that
adequate information gets to the President; but each President has tended in the
past, and doubtless will tend in the future, to shape the institutions to fit his
workaday world.
Woodrow Wilson delegated much authority in foreign affairs to Secretary of
State Bryan until the situation in Mexico and the threat of American involvement
in Europe produced a change. Cordell Hull, among others, has given adequate
testimony of FDR's frequent by-passing of the State Department in his exercise
of leadership,2 ' substituting Harry Hopkins, personal contact with foreign execu-
tives, and the Naval communications system for the traditional State Department
channels. The National Security Council, under Truman, according to one set of
authorities, tended to become "a sifter of staff memoranda,"22 and the most mo-
mentous decision of the Truman Administration, the intervention in Korea, was
made without consultation with the Council meeting as such, although weekly
meetings were made routine after that decision.23 President Eisenhower, with his
reliance on an almost air-tight staff system, has elevated and formalized the ad-
visory role of the Council. Although he overruled the Council on the question
of American intervention in Indo-China, consultation preceded the decision, and it
is permissible to guess that he relies heavily on Council staff work and on the
discussion and final opinions of the participants. He maintains, as Truman did not,
a Special Assistant on National Security Affairs who directs the work of the Council,
and has established the Operations Coordinating Board to try to insure the execution
22 THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 1109-I1 (x948); BURNS, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 383.
22 WILLIAM Y. ELLIOTT, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: ITS ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL 71 (1952).
23 TRUMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 59-6o, 333, 334 (1956).
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of decisions made by the Council. There is no assurance, however, that Eisen-
hower's changes or his reliance on the Council will set the pattern for his successor.
These aids to the President, in other words, have no life of their own, but
live in prosperity or poverty depending on the working habits of the President or
the situation at hand. Much the same can be said for the utilization of international
agencies, although here international conditions and the nature of the issue are as
important as personal preference in conditioning presidential choice. The United
States, perhaps more than any other nation, has depended on the United Nations
for its institutional leadership abroad. The original Baruch Plan, the United Action
for Peace Plan, intervention in Korea, the recent resolutions condemning the Anglo-
French involvement in Egypt, and the Atoms for Peace program were all initiated by
American Presidents in the international agency. Presidential dependence on the
United Nations has been based on the voting support in the General Assembly-
as the United Action for Peace Plan illustrates-of the generally sympathetic South
American and Western European blocs. With the addition of sixteen new states
by the Eleventh General Assembly, a reliable majority may not henceforth be avail-
able, and, thus, presidential use of the United Nations may become less frequent,
demonstrating again that the institutional expression of presidential leadership abroad
is relative to the international circumstances. Two examples will perhaps emphasize
the point. Notwithstanding President Truman's reliance on the United Nations,
it is clear that United States forces would have been committed to Korea even without
United Nations support. Only the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Union from the
Security Council permitted the President to add the prestige of the United Nations
to the prestige of the United States in this crisis. Secondly, the importance of NATO
has declined as a vehicle of presidential leadership as disagreements within the
Western alliance have increased in frequency and intensity. There can be, in sum,
no set institutional pattern for the application of international leadership in Wash-
ington or overseas. This factor puts additional strain on presidential decisiveness
and imagination.
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP ON THE PRESIDENCY
What have been the consequences of the President's attempts to fill his new role,
and what problems are created for the presidential office? The changes in the
Presidency within the last ten years, largely because of the new responsibility, have
been as great as the change in the preceding fifty years. It can be said that in most
respects Franklin Roosevelt's first term and the years of the Hoover administration
bear a greater resemblance to the Presidency of Grover Cleveland than to that of
Harry Truman. Just as America's involvement in world affairs has affected the
entire governmental system, the President's new responsibility has had a strong
impact on the traditional functions of the President and intensified old problems.
It is not as if one more function had been added to total one more than the previous
number of duties; rather, all of the traditional duties have been immersed in and
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distorted by the overriding function of international leadership. To illustrate how
complete the invasion of his other responsibilities has been, it is only necessary to
mark the relatively new presidential obligations of maintaining national prosperity
and promoting civil liberties. The interrelationship between the President's inter-
national responsibility and his national obligations is apparent. The one compli-
cates and intensifies the other. If the President avoids acting in the interest of civil
liberties by not enforcing the law or does not stand as a defender of civil rights
and legislative leader of reform in that field or if he does not take an active role in
promoting economic health at home, his leadership abroad suffers through the loss
of national prestige and power. In fact, it can be asserted that the President's
role as international leader has been instrumental in the firm establishment of these
other two twentieth-century additions to the President's duties.24 A sick economy
or a vacillating policy in civil rights can be as damaging to the President's efforts to
lead abroad as the lack of adequate military power. In sum, none of his duties are
free from international consequences.
This is apparent as one observes the impact of international leadership on the
traditional presidential functions. The addition of a fluctuating international
constituency to the President's national constituency has strengthened Congress, has
heaped new administrative problems on an already overburdened office and has
stultified the theory of less strenuous years that the President is to follow and
represent public opinion rather than lead or oppose, even in the field of foreign
affairs, where popular self-interest is not always enlightened and apathy, misinforma-
tion, and prejudice frequently hold sway.25 A new and complicating ingredient
has been added to presidential decision-making, an ingredient which has had a
considerable, and a still unmeasurable impact, on the tactics of leadership at home
and the institutions through which the leadership must be exercised. The execu-
tive, in the period since 1945, has been confronted with a decisive gain in the power
of Congress, a gain which is, paradoxically, largely the result of increased presi-
dential power and responsibility. Even in delegated legislative power, particularly
in foreign affairs and beginning significantly with the Lend-Lease Act, Congress is
making more and more use of joint or concurrent resolutions to provide for the
withdrawal, at short notice, of power granted to the President.20 The major reason
for the increase in congressional power is the monetary necessities of leadership and
consequent executive dependence on congressional appropriations. The power of the
Senate over treaties is now shared with the entire Congress, since the implementation
of treaties depends on appropriations. This reinvigoration of congressional power
in the cold war manifests itself in numberless investigations by congressional com-
mittees, concessions made by the President to Congress on appointments, and-a
development of better promise-the active participation of congressional leaders of
2 4 PP SIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SEcuRE THESE RIGHTS, 146-48 (1948).
2 WALTER LIPPMANN, ESSAYS IN THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY CC. 1-2 (1955).
" Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66
HA'v. L. REV. 569 (1953)-
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both parties in executive foreign policy councils. The reinvigorated power of Con-
gress calls for subdued use of the old weapons of legislative leadership and a new
emphasis on collaboration and conciliation in achieving crucial foreign-policy goals.
In his role as legislative leader, the President must be more cautious than formerly
and depend on his position as the best informed observer on foreign affairs in the
United States to carry the day in Congress. His most effective weapon today is an
appeal to Congress on the basis of national security and survival. He may appeal
indirectly to Congress through the electorate or to the consciences of individual
Congressmen. But this appeal must be used sparingly. Ultimately, he can by-pass
the Congress, as President Roosevelt did in 1942;27 but when there is no hot war,
this road can lead directly to a legislative dead end. Unless the President wishes
to take this chance, he can no longer be cavalier in his legislative leadership. And,
if changed tactics are one of the results of the President's international role, it should
be added that the President is forced, at times, to give less emphasis than he other-
wise would to domestic legislation. In some cases, the quid pro quo of international
leadership does mean the partial dissolution of leadership in the domestic field
and the delegation of this traditional responsibility to others, either in or out of
the presidential household2
Recent Presidents have recognized the increased power of Congress by supporting
greater collaboration between congressional committees and the executive agencies
and closer contact between the President and congressional leaders at a higher
level. What once was desirable is now essential. His relationship to his party and
interest groups has also been affected by his new international role. Directly, and
through Congress and his party, the President feels the pressure of group demands
and particularism which-frequently run counter to the interests of sound interna-
tional leadership. Important contributors to his party, loyal followers, and im-
portant groups in pivotal states lay claim to presidential allegiance. Members of
Congress, party leaders, and pressure groups-whether they are bicycle manu-
facturers interested in special tariff consideration, farmers demanding quotas or de-
structive dumping, Zionists, Irish-Americans, Slavic-Americans, or others sharing
common loyalties with groups or nations abroad-complicate and can obstruct, by
the very nature of their particularistic point of view, the President's efforts toward
sound international leadership. He must make the choice, and if it is against the
group interest, more often than not it will be a politically unpleasant one. In years
past, the President faced the relatively less difficult task of balancing the interests of
this national constituency against sectional or economic particularism; today, he must
include his international constituency in the equation. The Democratic Party's
policy toward Israel and the Republican commitment to "liberation" indicate that
V Message to Congress, Sept. 7, 1942, Domestic Economy of the United States, H. Doc. 834, 77 th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), 88 CoNG. Rac. 7052 (1942).
"8 Referring to a dispute between two department heads, Sherman Adams is said to have remarked:
"Either make up your mind or else tell me and I will do it. We cannot bother the President with this.
He is trying to keep the world from war." DONOVAN, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 71.
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partisan considerations can never be suppressed but as long as the cold war lasts,
the President cannot return to the free wheeling party leadership of an earlier day
without harming vital American interests and seriously jeopardizing his own success
as international leader.
The administrative consequences of the President's assumption of the role of
international leader are as striking as the effects on his traditional roles as party and
legislative leader. The growth of the bureaucracy in recent years is largely a product
of the President's need for help in fulfilling his new international responsibility.
Help indeed has been given, but the very increase in size has tended to put the
President in the center of a milling throng of unknown faces and has raised seem-
ingly insuperable problems of coordination and implementation. Conflicting policies
and statements are unavoidable even at the highest level, as the recent controversy
over the state of American defenses indicates. When deeply felt professional and
departmental loyalties are at stake, as they have been within the Department of State
or in the controversies between State, Defense, and Agriculture, coordination and
willing implementation are doubly difficult. Institutionalization of the President's
role as international leader is a partial answer as the development of the staff
system and more extensive use of the National Security Council and such agencies
as the Operations Coordinating Board under President Eisenhower demonstrate.
But institutionalization can never be the complete answer, partly because no amount
of institutionalization can suppress the centrifugal forces within such a large insti-
tutional group, and partly because institutionalization itself can breed currents of
inefficiency.
Some critics contend that inflexibility and lack of imagnation have been the
fruits of excessive institutionalization under President Eisenhower's leadership.
Whether this specific charge is valid or not, it seems quite certain that overdepend-
ence on the channels of the National Security Council, a staff system, along with
limited access to a busy President, can create obstructions to creative thinking as
well as remove them. There can be no substitute for the haphazard, sometimes acci-
dental, gifts of information that can come to a President from unexpected places.
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman depended on side-door informants whose ideas,
had the doors not been opened, might have been smothered in institutional channels.
President Eisenhower's informal dinners at the White House have also served this
purpose, and all Presidents have benefited from the weekly press conference which
should share honors with congressional visitors as a method for breaking down
institutional barriers. Similarly, as the President's leadership can be distorted in
institutional channels, his active leadership abroad can wane if it becomes impersonal.
The President cannot speak continually through the Department of State or in-
directly through his press secretary. By clever use of the press conference, appear-
ances before international agencies, and occasional trips to the summit, the President
can avoid being mired down in an administration designed to liberate him.
A final administrative problem that has been intensified by the President's
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responsibilities abroad is presidential control of specialists within his own administra-
tion-whether they are of the economic, scientific, or military variety. Lacking
special knowledge in one or more of these fields, the President must be on guard
constantly against the necessarily one-sided view of experts. From a military or
scientific viewpoint, for example, the continued testing of the hydrogen bomb may
seem sound, and yet, if the decision is made on technical grounds alone, the Presi-
dent's prestige abroad may suffer. President Eisenhower has avoided the dilemma of
overdependence on expert advice in a technical world because of his own unique
military and diplomatic experience. President Truman depended on many hours of
study and an awareness that even a technical decision was his alone. As he describes
his first day in office:2
... on that first full day as President I did more reading than I ever thought I could. I
even selected some papers to take home so that I might study them before retiring and
upon waking. This was the first step in a routine of nightly work that I found to be one
of the most trying but also one of the necessary duties of a President.
Difficult as it may be to resist the apparent certainties of technical advice, expert
opinion can never substitute for the reflective over-all view of the President. With
his new responsibility, in an increasingly complex world, the President is forced to
redouble his efforts to escape from the narrow, technical point of view. Living as
he does in an administrative labyrinth lined with the opinions of experts and
specialists, this requires administrative skill, some audacity, and perhaps super-human
wisdom.
Finally, the President's international role has placed in a new perspective the
relationship of the President to public opinion. Before the President had assumed
the obligation to try to lead other nations, he could afford to follow public opinion
and define the relationship with the public as one of translating electoral sentiment
into governmental action. When international leadership was addedhowever, other
factors came into play: the necessity for being aware of sentiment outside the United
States and being the active guide of opinion, and, on occasion, to be willing to act
against immediate popular wishes. The President's obligation to his national con-
stituency is no longer one of reflecting sentiment, but forming it. He must articulate
for the public in understandable terms the reason for presidential involvement
abroad. He must be able to establish in the public mind the consequences of a
failure to lead and make dramatically clear what Lippmann calls "the intangible
realities" of international powerY°
Under any circumstances, guiding public opinion is more difficult than trans-
forming public wishes into legislation. The difficulty is compounded in foreign
affairs because the issues, except in the pure air of an emergency, are not clear or
easily clarified. They are obscured by distance and their own complexity, while
the alternatives presented to the public are not between the pleasant and unpleasant
29 1 TRuMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 26-27 (1956).
"0 LiPpmAtN-, op. cit. supra note 25, at 55.
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but between the least unpleasant and the most unpleasant. The President must have
a rich fund of popular support if his leadership is to be sustained, but at the same
time he must be prepared to act without popular support if reflection and sound
advice dictate action in the national interest. Popularity is no measure of sound
public policy in this field. The crux of the President's relationship with the public
in this new situation is, in fact, the long-term preparation of public opinion for the
unpopular action by a careful mixture of exhortation and appeals to self preserva-
tion. The President can no longer permit the quality of his leadership to be molded
by powerful interest groups; he can no longer be the passive receptacle of active public
opinion, partly because in foreign affairs there is oftentimes no public opinion.
He must create public opinion and yet refuse to yield to public voices which, if
followed, would cast doubt on his capacity to lead abroad. The President must take
full account of the palatable or unpalatable truth of America's international position
and make that position forcefully clear in the public mind. As Thucydides re-
marked of Pericles, "Certainly when he saw that they were going too far in a mood
of over-confidence, he would bring back to them a sense of their dangers; and when
they were discouraged for no good reason he would restore their confidence." And
he must be willing to accept the short-run political sacrifices that international
leadership demands.
Since President Eisenhower's illness in 1955, it is impossible to discuss the
Presidency without recognizing that the President's efforts to direct unpredictable
international forces in the face of resourceful maneuvers by the Soviet Union, the
contradictory interests of American allies and neutrals, and a complex constitutional
system contribute more than any other activity to the tense weariness associated with
the modern Presidency. If the Presidency is today, as Harry Truman described it,
"like riding a tiger," it is because the President must deal with gargantuan im-
ponderables which frequently cannot be reflected upon or completely understood but
only inspected hurriedly before a decision is made. Perhaps history will conclude
that the job is beyond the capacity of the man and the office, even though costly
adjustments have been made to meet the President's new role. When one recalls
the optimum conditions for effective international leadership-harmonious con-
gressional-executive relations, effective administrative planning and coordination, the
presence of a cohesive force abroad, among others-it is quite apparent that the
President will never reach the exalted position of sustained international leadership,
even if this were desirable, short of a severe world crisis or actual war. The present
cold war environment requires that the President attempt to lead in the interest of
American security, even though the attempt alone complicates his other presidential
functions. He can only hope, when the anti-Soviet forces need leadership, that
for an undetermined period of time his leadership will take hold.
